Absrrocr-It is conventionally assumed that all wireless device will follow the prescribed muting protocols without any dwiation. However, the ~~r~i t y of resources in wireless devices rakes B concern about this assumption. Most often, instead faithfully follow the pmtowls, the ownem of wireless devices will try to manipulate the pmtocols for their own benefits. Io this paper, we specifically study the multicast in s e f i h and rational wireless ad hoc networks. By assuming that each wireless node has a private cost of forwarding data for other nodes, we first give an efficient method to construct a multieast tree, namely VMST, whose cost is B 5-appmximation of the optimum multicast tree's cwt for homogeneous wireless networks. We then design B truthful payment scheme that pays minimum for any relay node among all truthful payment schemes based on VMST.
I. INTRODUCTION
Majority of the existing wireless ad hoc network routing protocols assume that each individual wireless terminal (possibly owned by individual selfish users) will follow the prescribed routing protocols without deviation. However, the rational and se!$sh users who aim to maximize their own profit instead of faithfully relaying the packets for others will deviate from the protocol, or even modify the behavior of the routing protocols. Thus, a stimulation mechanism is required to encourage users to provide service to other nodes and follow the designed routing protocols.
In this paper, we study how to design a multicast routing protocol in a wireless ad hoc network settings where every wireless terminal a private cost of transmitting the packet. We design the truthful multicast routing protocol such that every rational selfish wireless node will follow it without any deviation. As to our knowledge, this is thefirst paper to study how to design a multicast protocol that is truthful in wireless ad hoc settings. Our protocol first outputs a multicast tree (called VMST) which is at most 5 times of the optimum when every node in the original wireless ad hoc network has the same transmission range, which can he modelled by a Unit Disk Graph (UDG) .Based on the tree VMST, we design a truthful payment scheme which pays minimum for any relay terminals among all truthful payment schemes based on VMST. Extensive experiments has been conducted to show our protocol does work well in practice.
PRELIMINARIES

A. Network Model and problem statement
In a wireless ad hoc Network, if a node sends a packet, then it will consume some energy and usually it is assumed that it wouldn't cost the receiving node any energy to receive the message. We consider a wireless ad hoc network consisting of a node set V = {VI, v2,. . . ,on} distributed in a two dimensional plane and each node vi has a private fixed cost ci to relay a unit data. In this paper, we represent a wireless ad hoc network as of all nodes. In order to prevent monopoly, we assume that the graph G is node hi-connected.
In this paper, we study the multicast problem which is the communication among a group of nodes Q = { q l , 92,. . . , q?} c V . For the simplicity of notations, we assume that q. = ut. for 1 < i < T. In order for node q1 E Q to multicast the message to the other receiving nodes in Q, we first construct a multicast tree T spanning all nodes in Q such that, whenever an internal node v E T receiving a new message, it broadcasts the message to all its neighbors. The summation of the cost of all nodes in T is called the weight of the tree T , denoted as w ( T ) . To save energy consumption, we want to find a tree TOpt whose weight is the minimum among all trees used for multicast. It is known (see e.g., [SI) that it is NP-hard to find the optimal solution when given an arbitrary wireless ad hoc network. Furthermore, when the wireless ad hoc network can he modelled as UDG, there is still no known algorithm that can find the optimal solution. Thus, instead of finding the optimal solution, we try to find a multicast tree whose cost is not too large compared with the optimal one. Based on that tree, we need to design a truthful payment scheme such that every terminal will relay the packet and reveal their true cost in order to maximize their own benefit.
B. Truthful Mechanism Design
Traditionally, the following model is used to analyze scenarios in which the agents act according to their own self-interests. There are n agents, i.e., there are n selfish wireless terminals and each agent i, for i E {I,. . . , n}, has some private information ti, called its type. In this paper, the type ti is its cost to forward a unit data in a network environment. Then all agents' types define a type vector t = (P, t 2 , ' . ' , t"). There is an output function 0 that maps each type vector t to a set of allowed outputs. For each strategy vector a = (a', '. . ,a"), i.e., agent i plays
is the money given to each participating agent i. Arguably the most important positive result in mechanism design is what is called the family of generalized Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG).mechanisms by V i c h y [SI, Clarke [I] , and Groves [4] . A mechanism M = ( U ( t ) , p ( t ) ) belongs to the VCG family if (I) the output method U ( t ) maximizes the oh- ,v'((t',o) , and (2) the payment to agent i is p'(t) = C j z i d ( t j , o ( t ) ) + h' ((t-a) ), where hi() is an arbitraryfunction o f t -' and different agent could have different function hi() as long as it is defined on t-'. It is proved by Groves [4] that a VCG is truthful. An important observation here is that the output function of a VCG mechanism is required to maximize the objective function. This makes the mechanism computationally intractable in many cases, such as the multicast problem studied in this paper. Notice that replacing the optimal algorithm with non-optimal approximation usually leads to untruthful mechanisms. To made the mechanism polynomial time computable, we have to add computational efficiency to the set of concems that must he addressed [7] .
C. PriorAris
Routing has been part of the algorithmic mechanismdesign from the beginning. Nisan and Ronen [7] provided a polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism for optimal unicast route selection in a centralized computational model. In their formulation, the network is modelled as a n abstract edge weigted graph G = (V, E ) . In addition, the result in [7] can he easily extended to deal with all-to-all traffics instead of the fixed source and destination node. Feigenhaum et. a1 [2] then addressed the truthful low cost routing in a different network model. They assumed that each node k incurs a transit cost Ck for each transit packet it carries. They also gave a distributed method such that each node i can compute a number p t j > 0, which is the payment to node k for carrying the transit traffic from node i to node j if node k is on LCP(i, j).
STRATEGYPROOF MULTICAST DESIGN
In this section, we propose a truthful multicast routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks such that each selfish and rational node will follow the protocol out of its own self-interest.
A. Multicast Tree Construction
Given a wireless ad hoc network modelled by a node weighted graph G = (V, E , c ) , where the node cost vector is c, Our protocol first constmcts a cost efficient spanning tree for multicast routing as follows.
Calculates the pairwise shortest path LCP(q,, qj, G ) between any two nodes qi, qj E Q. 2. Construct a complete edge weighted graph K ( G , &) using Q as its vertices, where edge q,qj corresponds to LCP(q,, qj, G ) , and its weight ur(qiqj) is the cost of LCP(q,,qj,G), i.e., 4 q i q j ) = ILCP(qi,qj,G)/.
Algorithm I : Virtual MST Algorithm 'For our later convenience. the total weight of the least cost path
Construct a minimum spanning tree (MST) on K ( G , Q). The resulting MST is denoted as V M S T ( G ) .
For each edge qiqj selected in V M S T ( G ) , we find the corresponding least cost path LCP(qi, qj, G) in G.
We mark every intemal node w k on the path LCP(q;, q j , G ) as relay node. 5. In graph G, build a spanning tree using all nodes marked as relay nodes and all receivers Q. Denote the final spanning tree on G as SVMST (G) .
Notice a node is in tree S V M S T ( G ) if and only if it is on some virtual edges in V M S T ( G ) , thus we consider the structure V M S T ( G ) instead of SVMST(G). Theorem 1: V M S T ( G )
is a 5-approximation of the optimal solution in tetms of the total cost if the wireless underline wireless ad hoc network is modelled by a unit disk graph.
PROOF. Assume that the optimal solution is a tree called Topt. Let V(TOpt) be the set of nodes used in the tree Topt. Clearly, w(Topt) = Cu,Ev(T,,rl c;. Similarly, for any spanning tree T
of K ( G , Q ) , we define w ( T ) = C e E T w ( e ) . Following we prove that 5 . w(Topt) 2 w ( V M S T ( G ) ) .
First, for all nodes in Toptr when disregarding the node weight, there is a spanning tree T& on V(TOpt) with node degree at most 5 when the wireless network is modelled by a unit disk graph. For spanning tree TApt, we root it at an arbitrary node and duplicate every link in T& (the resulting structure is called DT;,,) . Clearly, every node in DT&, has even degree now. Thus, we can find an Euler circuit, denoted by EC (DT&,) , that visits every vertex of DT&, and uses every edge of DT& exactly once, which is equivalent to say that every edge in T&,, (G) is used exactly twice. Consequently, we know that every node U k in V(T,,) is used exactly degTApL (wk) times. Here degc(w) denotes the degree of a node U in a graph G. Thus, the total weight of the Euier circuit is at most 5 times of the weight w(T&), i.e., If we walk along EC(DT&,), we visit all receivers, and length of any suhpath between receivers q; and qj is not smaller than ILCP (qi,qj,G) 
I. Thus, the cost of EC(DT&,) is at least w(VMST(G)) which implies w(EC(DT&,)) 2 w(VMST(G)). Consequently, we have w(EC(DT&,)) 5 5 ' w(T&).
This finishes the proof.
a
Notice that the assumption that the receiver nodes will relay the transit traffic for other receiver nodes for free is crucial in the above proof. If this is not the case, then we can show that Theorem I does not hold anymore.
B. Payment Scheme
In the previous subsection, we show that the VMST is a 5 approximation for the minimum cost multicast tree for homogeneous wireless networks modelled by unit disk graphs. In this subsection, we will design a truthful payment scheme based on the tree VMST. For simplicity of our notation, we will use cost LCP(q,, q j , G) does not include the cost of two end-paints q, and q j . We also assume that no two edges in G = (V, E , c) 
, d ) and V M S T ( G ) is simply denoted as V M S T ( d ) when G = (V, E , d ) .
If we change the cost of a node zrk E V to d6, we denote the new graph as dlkd6. If we remove one vertex uk from G, we denote the resulting graph as dlkoo.
B . l VCG mechanism Is Not Truthful
Intuitively, we can use VCG mechanism as a payment scheme for multicast. The payment to a node U k selected in V M S T based on VCG mechanisms is as follows Unfortunately, if we use the VCG payment scheme, Figure 1 shows an example where node zrg can lie its cost to improve its utility, which is not truthful. Thus, we need to design a truthful payment scheme for VMST without using VCG mechanism.
B.2 Payment Scheme Based on VMST Given a spanning tree T , and a pair of nodes p and q on T , there is a unique path connecting them on T . We 
V M S T ( d ) ) . Based on the structure V M S T ( d ) ,
we then design a truthful mechanism for calculating the payment to relay nodes on V M S T ( d ) as follows. (1)
For every node
Here III denotes the total cost of a path II. The final payment to node uk based on V
M S T ( d ) is
Regarding the payment scheme 2 we have the following two theorems.
Theorem 2: Our payment scheme is truthful, i.e, it satisfies both Incentive Compatibility (IC) and Individual Rationality(1R).
Theorem 3: For structure V M S T , the payment based on (2) to any node Uk is minimum among all truthful mechanisms based on VMST.
The proof of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 is' omitted here due to space limit, refer to the full version for details.
C. Fast Payment Computing
In this subsection, we discuss how to compute the payment to every relay terminal efficiently. Here, we assume that the original communication graph G has n vertices and m edges. One naive method of computing the payment works as follows: first'construct the complete graph K ( d ) and then construct the spanning tree 
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied how to design a multicast routing protocol for selfish and rational wireless ad hoc networks, in which each wireless node will relay the data packets for other nodes when it receives a payment to compensate its cost. We proposed the first truthful mechanism that is based on a multicast structure whose total cost is within 5 times of the optimum when the wireless networks are modelled by UDG. We also gave efficient method to compute the payment for all relay nodes on the constructed multicast tree. We proved that each node will follow the protocol and will maximize its profit when it declares its true cost. 
